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Independent financial advisers’ opinions for
public takeovers and related party transactions
in Singapore
Wai Yee Wan*
This article examines the role and utility of opinions rendered by independent
financial advisers, who are required to be appointed in connection with
takeovers of, and related party transactions entered into by, companies which
are listed in Singapore. Three main problems are identified: (i) data from
advisers’ opinions issued between 2008 and 2010 in connection with
takeover offers of Singapore-listed companies show that there are a
significant number of advisers who do not use the standard of “fair and
reasonable” in assessing offers and instead use tests that are more
equivocal, rendering the opinions less helpful; (ii) advisers remain subject to
inherent bias and such bias is not easily detectable due to their wide
discretion in choosing appropriate assumptions and methodologies; and
(iii) there are a number of limitations faced by investors in bringing common
law or statutory claims against advisers for failings in care and expertise,
honesty or independence for the opinions they issue in takeover documenta-
tion. This article suggests solutions that improve the reliability and quality of
these opinions, increase the incentives of advisers to produce meaningful
and unbiased opinions, and at the same time, allow investors to have
appropriate rights of recovery against them.
INTRODUCTION
Independent financial advisers are required to be appointed in principally two types of corporate
transactions involving companies listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). First, when there is a
takeover offer for the company, the board is required to seek independent advice from an independent
financial adviser under the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Code).1 Secondly,
when the company proposes to enter into a related party transaction with its director, chief executive
officer or controlling shareholder or any of their respective associates, and the size of the transaction
exceeds certain prescribed thresholds, the board is required to appoint an independent financial adviser
under the Listing Manual of the Singapore Exchange (Listing Manual);2 in such a case, the
independent financial adviser advises the board on whether the transaction is on normal commercial
terms and is not prejudicial to the interests of the company and its minority shareholders. Independent
financial advisers who are appointed to advise on takeover offers and related party transactions are
typically investment banks, boutique corporate finance firms or corporate advisory arms of accounting
firms.
The primary justification for requiring independent advice is predicated on the independent
financial adviser giving an objective and professional analysis of the takeover offer or related party
transaction, which will enable the board to evaluate the offer or transaction and give its
recommendation to the shareholders. The recommendation of the board usually matches the
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recommendation of the adviser. Shareholders can also review the analysis performed by the adviser
and come to their own conclusion on whether to accept the offer or vote in favour of the transaction,
as the case may be.
Independent financial advisers’ opinions have come under increased scrutiny, both in Singapore
and in other jurisdictions, due to the perceived conflicts of interest that exist between the adviser and
the company that engages the adviser or between the adviser and the company’s controlling
shareholders. In addition, questions have been raised as to the quality of independent financial
advisers’ opinions. In Singapore, during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and its aftermath, a significant
number of takeover offers were privatisations3 which involved controlling shareholders seeking to
obtain 100% ownership of the companies by cashing out the minority shareholders.4 In many of these
cases, the minority shareholders were dissatisfied with the consideration offered by the controlling
shareholders, especially where the consideration offered valued the target companies at less than their
net tangible asset values. The independent financial advisers’ opinions, which assessed these offers as
fair and reasonable, had been criticised as either partisan towards the bidders (who were also the
controlling shareholders) or as having used inappropriate methodologies.5
Recently, concerns over the independence and quality of advice have led to a review by the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) of its policies on independent expert
reports, which are the functional equivalent of independent financial advisers’ opinions in Singapore.6
Pursuant to the review, changes were made to these policies to enhance the quality and reliability of
the reports.7 In Malaysia, the Securities Commission recently reviewed the quality of the independent
advice in takeovers and proposed amendments in its securities regulations to improve the quality of
such advice.8
This article re-examines the role and utility of independent financial advisers’ opinions; in
connection therewith, a review is conducted of 132 opinions issued in connection with takeover offers
of companies listed on the SGX for the three-year period between 2008 and 2010. While the focus of
this article is on Singapore transactions, comparisons are made with independent financial advisers’
opinions and their functional equivalents in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Australia and Malaysia,
where relevant. The aim of this article is to identify the problems with relying on such opinions and
how improvements can be made.
The article begins by systematically analysing the role of independent financial advisers’ opinions
in takeovers and identifies three main problems with relying on such opinions in takeover offers. First,
the review of recent opinions shows that a significant number depart from the “fair and reasonable”
test and that independent financial advisers have used tests that are more equivocal and
correspondingly less helpful. Independent financial advisers also have substantial discretion over the
choice of methodologies and assumptions in rendering their opinions. Secondly, while the Singapore
Securities Industry Council has issued a practice statement9 to ensure that independent financial
advisers are, and are seen to be, independent, they remain subject to inherent bias due to their desire to
retain and attract clients. Thirdly, shareholders are unlikely to recover substantial damages against
3 Khoo L, “Delistings Likely to Outpace IPOs”, Business Times (18 July 2011).
4 Sivanithy R, “Time to Raise Standards and Rethink Regulatory Approach”, Business Times (24 June 2011), pointing out that
the privatisations/delistings in the last decade (2000 to 2010) were motivated by frustration and disillusionment at being
persistently undervalued and having to suffer poor liquidity.
5 For example, Chew X, “No Minority Support for Kingboard Copper Exit Offer”, Business Times (1 August 2009); Lee J,
“Financial Advisers Defend Stance on Exit Offers”, Business Times (21 September 2009).
6 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Expert Reports and Independence of Experts: Updates to RG 111
and RG 112, Consultation Paper 143 (October 2010).
7 ASIC, Response to Submissions on CP 143 Expert Reports and Independence of Experts, Report 234 (March 2011).
8 Securities Commission of Malaysia, Public Consultation Paper: Proposed Updates to Guidelines on Offer Documentation of
the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998, PCP 2/2010 (March 2010); Securities Commission of Malaysia, Public
Response Paper: Proposed Updates to Guidelines on Contents of Applications Relating to the Malaysian Code of Takeovers and
Mergers 1998, PPP 2/2010 (28 January 2011).
9 See Singapore, Securities Industry Council, Public Statement on Requirement for Independent Advice on Takeover Offers
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independent financial advisers as a consequence of their having issued false or misleading opinions
rendered in takeovers under common law or the statutory compensation regime, even where advisers
have failed to act with care and expertise, honesty or independence.
The article then considers the issues arising from independent financial advisers’ opinions issued
in related party transactions. It discusses three possible options for reform. First, independent financial
advisers should be required to evaluate transactions based on the objective standard of “fair and
reasonable”. Secondly, in appropriate cases, courts should review the reasonableness of the
assumptions and valuation methodologies used to prepare independent financial advisers’ opinions.
Thirdly, changes should be made to the existing statutory regime to allow shareholders a right, albeit
limited, to bring actions against advisers for losses incurred as a result of having reasonably relied on
their misleading opinions. The final part provides a conclusion.
THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL ADVISER OPINIONS IN TAKEOVERS
Background
A takeover offer for the shares of a Singapore-listed company, irrespective of whether it is
incorporated in Singapore or not, may be structured as
• a general offer for the target shares;
• a scheme of arrangement under s 210 of the Companies Act (Sing), Cap 50 (2006 rev ed)
(Companies Act); or
• an offer for shares which is conditional upon voluntary delisting of the company (exit offer).10
All of these offers have to comply with the Takeover Code, so long as the target company is either a
public company incorporated in Singapore or is a foreign company which has a primary listing in
Singapore.11
Different approval thresholds and processes apply for each of the takeover structures. A voluntary
offer must be conditional, at the minimum, upon the bidder receiving acceptances which will result in
the bidder and its concert parties holding more than 50% of the voting rights in the target.12 If the
target is incorporated in Singapore and the bidder receives acceptances of 90% or more of the shares
which are the subject of the offer, the bidder is entitled to exercise its rights to compulsorily acquire
the shares from the minority shareholders under s 215 of the Companies Act. A scheme of arrangement
effected under s 210 of the Companies Act requires the approval of a majority in number of
shareholders present and voting, representing 75% or more in value of shares voted, as well as the
sanction of the court.
For an exit offer,13 the company must first obtain the approval of shareholders for the delisting
proposal, which requires the approval of at least 75% of shareholders present and voting, with not
(7 August 2002), http://www.mas.gov.sg/resource/news_room/press_releases/2002/sicps_7Aug02.pdf viewed 10 November
2011.
10 This article is only concerned with voluntary delistings and not mandatory delistings (where the Singapore Exchange forces
the company to delist due to, eg, persistent poor results or non-compliance with listing rules) which raise separate and different
issues. If the company is incorporated in Singapore, there are two additional possible alternative transaction structures to
privatise the company, that is, the amalgamation procedure under ss 215A to 215J of the Companies Act and the selective
cancellation of shares pursuant to ss 78A to 78I of the Companies Act. However, the former has never been utilised for listed
companies, and the latter is usually utilised for selective cancellation of shares of listed companies with the agreement of the
shareholders whose shares are cancelled. Accordingly, they are not considered in this article. For a detailed discussion of the
reasons these provisions are not typically used to structure privatisation transactions, see Wan WY, “Effecting Compulsory
Acquisition via the Amalgamation Procedure in Singapore” [2007] SJLS 323.
11 Takeover Code, Introduction at [2]. The Securities Industry Council has the discretion to waive the application of the
Takeover Code to Singapore-incorporated companies with a primary listing overseas and unlisted public companies with more
than 50 shareholders and more than S$5 million of net tangible assets. The Takeover Code also applies to registered business
trusts and real estate investment trusts. This article is only concerned with takeover offers for companies.
12 Takeover Code, r 15.1.
13 Although the Listing Manual does not specify who can make the exit offer, the exit offer is normally made by the controlling
shareholders of the company as they are the ones with the most interest in seeing that the company complies with the delisting
rules, assuming that they intend to retain the shares in the company after it is delisted.
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more than 10% of such shareholders objecting. The delisting proposal must be conditional upon a
“reasonable” exit offer, in cash, to shareholders.14 This method is often used where a bidder holds
significant shareholdings in the target, because the bidder may vote, together with minority
shareholders, for the delisting proposal, and thereby reduce the transaction risks.15 Although this
method does not ensure that all minority shareholders will tender their shares in the exit offer that is
made after the delisting is approved, in practice, once the delisting is approved, minority shareholders
would not want to hold shares in an unlisted company and would be motivated to accept the exit
offer.16
The Takeover Code is administered by the Singapore Securities Industry Council.17 Although the
Takeover Code does not have the force of law and a breach of any of its provisions does not result in
any criminal proceeding,18 its breach may result in the imposition of sanctions by the Securities
Industry Council, including private reprimands, public censures and depriving the offender of its
ability to enjoy the facilities of the securities market.19
Independent financial adviser opinions
Once a bidder makes a formal takeover offer for the target, the Takeover Code requires the target
board to obtain independent advice.20 Generally, for a general offer or a scheme of arrangement, the
independent financial adviser21 evaluates whether the offer is “fair and reasonable”, subject to the
discussion below. If the offer is a reverse takeover, the offeror board must obtain independent advice,22
and if a whitewash waiver is sought, generally, the independent financial adviser evaluates whether the
waiver is prejudicial to the interests of the independent shareholders.23 If the offer is structured as an
exit offer, the SGX requires the independent financial adviser to specifically evaluate whether the offer
is reasonable to all shareholders and that its opinion must be clear and unequivocal without reference
to the diverse investment horizons of shareholders.24
Market practice in Singapore is that the independent financial adviser’s written opinion is
addressed only to the directors of the target board who are regarded as independent for the purposes of
14 Listing Manual, rr 1307 and 1309.
15 In comparison, for a scheme of arrangement under s 210 of the Companies Act, the bidder and its concert parties do not form
the same class as the rest of the shareholders and must abstain from voting at the class meeting convened to obtain the approval
of the shareholders: see Takeover Code, Introduction at [10]; and Re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 123.
16 In the exit offer, if the target company is a Singapore company, and the bidder acquires at least 90% of acceptances of shares
which are the subject matter of the exit offer, the bidder can also exercise its rights under s 215 of the Companies Act.
17 Securities and Futures Act (Sing), Cap 289 (2006 rev ed), s 138.
18 Securities and Futures Act (Sing), s 139.
19 Takeover Code, Introduction at [2].
20 Takeover Code, r 7.1. See also Singapore, Securities Industry Council, Practice Statement on Directors Making
Recommendations on an Offer (21 December 2004). There is an exception from the requirement to appoint an independent
financial adviser where an offer is a partial offer which could not result in the bidder and its concert parties holding 30% or more
of the voting rights.
21 Strictly speaking, Takeover Code, r 7 only requires “competent independent advice” and does not state that the advice can
only be given by a financial adviser. However, in practice, a financial adviser, not another professional such as the solicitor or
the company’s auditor, provides the advice. In particular, rules on audit independence would normally preclude the auditors
from offering corporate advisory services to the audit client: Accountants (Public Accountants) Rules (2004 ed), “Code of
Professional Conduct and Ethics for Public Accountants and Accounting Entities”.
22 Takeover Code, r 7.2.
23 A whitewash waiver may be sought in a reverse takeover, where the listed company acquires assets in consideration for the
issuance of shares, and the party receiving the shares may end up having to make a mandatory offer for the company unless the
independent shareholders waive their right to receive a mandatory offer.
24 Singapore Exchange, Regulator’s Column, Companies Seeking Delisting Must Provide Reasonable Exit Offer to Shareholders
(4 September 2009), http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/cp_en/site/regulation/regulators_column/2009/DELISTING?
presentationtemplate=design_lib/PT_Printer_Friendly viewed 9 June 2011.
Independent financial advisers’ opinions for public takeovers and related party transactions in Singapore
(2012) 30 C&SLJ 32 35
the offer (independent directors).25 Under the Takeover Code, only the independent directors are
required to advise the shareholders on the offer.26 Notwithstanding that the opinion is addressed only
to the independent directors, the opinion containing the underlying analysis will be published in the
circular to shareholders. The circular will also contain the independent directors’ recommendation on
the offer, including whether they agree with the independent financial adviser’s assessment. In almost
every case, a fair and reasonable opinion from the adviser will be matched by the recommendation of
independent directors to accept the offer or vote in favour of the transaction. If the independent
directors disagree with the adviser’s opinion, the independent directors will need to give reasons.27
The requirement for the board to obtain independent advice for takeover offers is also present in
the United Kingdom,28 Hong Kong,29 Australia30 and Malaysia31 (although for Australia, the
requirement applies only to certain transaction structures rather than to all takeover offers). In the
United States, while there is no strict legal requirement to do so, directors of companies which are the
subject of takeover offers or mergers often obtain “fairness opinions” from financial advisers to advise
them on the fairness of consideration paid in the transaction.32 The financial advisers who render
United States-style “fairness opinions” may or may not meet the stringent independence requirements
required of the independent financial advisers who are rendering independent advice under the
Takeover Code.33
The independent financial adviser’s opinion serves a number of purposes. First, the opinion,
including its underlying analysis, provides the independent directors with significant information in
evaluating the offer. In fulfilling a director’s statutory and common law duties of care, s 157C of the
Companies Act allows for reliance on a professional adviser in relation to matters which the director
believes on reasonable grounds to be within the person’s professional competence.34 Although it is not
within the scope of the authority of an independent financial adviser to negotiate with the bidder, and
25 The reason is likely due to concerns over liability. See the discussion below. Exceptionally, where there are no independent
directors, the independent financial adviser advises the shareholders directly: Takeover Code, r 24.1, n 3.
26 Takeover Code, r 24.1, n 3. Directors who are not independent of the offer may be exempted from making a recommendation,
though they remain responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the documents issued by the company.
27 Takeover Code, r 7.1, n 3.
28 United Kingdom, Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (10th ed, 2011), r 3.1.
29 Hong Kong, Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases, r 2.1.
30 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and regulations thereunder prescribe the circumstances in which an expert report is required. See
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 640 (takeover bid where the bidder holds at least 30% in the target or when the bidder and target
have common directors) and s 636 (when the consideration paid by the bidder for acquiring a pre-bid stake includes unquoted
securities); Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth), reg 5.1.01 and Sch 8, cll 8303 and 8306 (schemes of arrangement in certain
circumstances); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 663B, 664C, 665B, 667A (compulsory acquisitions or buyouts), ss 218, 219,
220 and 221 (related party transactions).
31 See Securities Commission of Malaysia, n 8 (March 2010).
32 See Lipton M and Steinberger E, Takeovers and Freezeouts (Law Journal Press, 2004) at [8.06]. In Smith v Van Gorkom 488
A 2d 858 (1985), the Delaware Supreme Court, in holding that directors violated their duty of care, emphasised the failure of
the directors to obtain a fairness opinion.
33 For example, while a financial adviser who renders a United States-style fairness opinion for a target company may be one
who has no previous role in the transaction, it is equally possible for an incumbent adviser to give the opinion, even where the
adviser has participated in the negotiations with the bidder leading to the offer. Such an adviser would not have satisfied the
independence requirements in the Takeover Code, r 7. For example, in the recent privatisation of Chartered Semiconductor
Manufacturing Ltd, a Singapore company which was dual-listed on the SGX and NASDAQ in 2009, more particularly
described below at n 56, separate opinions from Chartered’s financial advisers (who gave the fairness opinions) and the
independent financial adviser (required under the Takeover Code) were disclosed to shareholders. The fairness opinions were
rendered by the incumbent advisers of the target who had participated in the negotiations of the transaction while the
independent financial adviser did not have a role in the negotiations leading up to the transaction.
34 The other requirements in s 157C of the Companies Act are that the director has acted in good faith, makes proper inquiry and
has no knowledge that such reliance is unwarranted.
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such a role should be undertaken by the target’s financial adviser, there is empirical evidence that a
“not fair and reasonable” opinion from the independent financial adviser is more likely to lead to an
improved offer by the bidder.35
Secondly, in Singapore, Hong Kong,36 Australia37 and Malaysia,38 there is either market practice
or a regulatory requirement for the detailed analysis of the independent financial adviser’s opinion (or
its functional equivalent) to be disclosed to shareholders.39 Hence, the adviser’s opinion not only
supports the board’s recommendation but will go towards discharging the board’s duty to provide
shareholders with all relevant information and advice to make an informed decision on the offer.40
Similarly, disclosing the adviser’s opinion to shareholders in connection with their approval for a
related party transaction will go towards satisfying the requirement that shareholders be given
sufficient information to make an informed decision about the proposal to be voted at the general
meeting.41
Thirdly, while an auction process is useful to determine the fairness and reasonableness of a bid,
such a market-based process is not always available. For example, an auction is not available where
the controlling shareholders of a company have no intention of selling their shares. The independent
financial adviser’s opinion is the closest substitute to a market-based check as to whether the offer
price is fair and reasonable. In fact, the SGX will place considerable weight on the adviser’s opinion
that the exit offer is reasonable in deciding whether the target company is allowed to be voluntarily
delisted.
Critics of independent financial advisers’ opinions (or their functional equivalents) have argued
that these opinions do not bring any new information to the market.42 Based on the theory of the
efficient market hypothesis, all relevant information that is material in respect of the target is already
reflected in the target’s share price.43 It is also argued that a superior method to determine the fairness
of the price is via holding an auction or undertaking a market check.44 However, these arguments fail
to give adequate emphasis to the fact that an independent financial adviser’s opinion contains
analytical elements which investment banks and financial advisers are particularly suited to do.
Investors who do not have the time or resources will find the adviser’s opinion useful as a tool in
35 See Bugela M, “Effect of Independent Expert Reports in Australian Takeovers” (2005) 45 Accounting and Finance 519,
examining takeovers for companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during the period 1990 to 2000 and finding that
50% of the takeovers are increased where an expert indicates that the offer is “not fair and reasonable” and only 14% of the
takeovers are increased when an expert indicates that the offer is “fair and reasonable”.
36 Hong Kong, n 29, r 2.1. In 1990, pursuant to the comprehensive review of the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers
(as it then was), amendments were made to require the inclusion of the written opinion of the independent financial adviser,
including the reasons for the opinion. The rationale was that in some instances the quality of the advice given to minority
shareholders where an offer is made by a controlling shareholder has not been as good as it should be: Securities and Futures
Commission, Consultation Paper and Draft Revision of Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (April 1990) p 7.
37 See discussion in n 30. Where the expert report is required, the independent expert is also required to give reasons.
38 Securities Commission of Malaysia, n 8 (March 2010).
39 In the United Kingdom, the market practice is that the advice does not enter into detail, and only provides whether the
independent financial adviser regards the offer as fair and reasonable. There is little pressure in the United Kingdom for a more
precise formulation or to give reasons: see Johnston A, The City Take-over Code (OUP, 1980) p 218.
40 Takeover Code, GP 9.
41 See Re RAC Motoring Services Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 307 at 326-327, approving Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v
Southern Resources Ltd (1988) 14 ACLR 375 at 377; CAS (Nominees) v Nottingham Forest [2002] 1 BCLC 613 at 639.
42 See eg Carney WJ, “Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It” (1992) 70 Wash ULQ
523 at 528, arguing that “investment banker’s fairness opinion thus becomes another costly tax that legal rules impose on
business transactions”.
43 For example, Matolcsy ZP, “The Evaluation of Independent Expert’s Advice on Takeover Offers: An Economics-Finance
Perspective” (1982) 10 ABLR 99.
44 For example, Kerin P, “Not Much Fair or Reasonable”, The Australian (7 August 2007). See also Davidoff S, “Fairness
Opinions” (2006) 55 Am ULR 1557 (in the context of United States fairness opinions).
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assessing the offer.45 Independent directors may also require expertise in evaluating the transactions.
The efficient market hypothesis was also shown to have serious limits in the recent financial crisis.46
Moreover, as explained above, an auction is not always available and there may be good reasons why
directors determine that a market check is inappropriate in the circumstances.
THE PROBLEMS WITH INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL ADVISERS’ OPINIONS IN
TAKEOVERS
This part of the article examines whether independent financial advisers’ opinions issued in takeover
offers for Singapore-listed companies serve the informational or shareholder protection functions set
out above. Circulars issued by companies (including Singapore and foreign companies) with primary
listings on the SGX, and which were subject to takeover offers during the period between 2008 and
2010, were identified based on the filings by these companies on the SGX’s website, using the search
“Shareholders’ Circular”,47 for the relevant years. The SDC Platinum was used to cross-check the list
of takeover offers, with omissions added to the sample by manually collecting from various sources.48
This search identified 132 independent financial advisers’ opinions issued during that period. The
conclusions reached by the advisers are analysed in Table 1.
TABLE 1 Conclusions reached by independent financial advisers in respect of
takeovers offers, 2008-2010
Conclusions reached by independent financial advisers 2008 2009 2010
Offers (excluding reverse takeovers and capital raising transactions giving rise to whitewash waivers)
(a) Offer is fair and reasonable 12 (4)* 10 (6)* 15 (8)*
(b) Offer is not fair and reasonable 1 (1) 0 3
(c) Offer is fair 3 2 (1)* 1
(d) Offer is not fair 0 1 0
(e) Offer is reasonable 3 3 (2)* 4 (1)*
(f) Offer is fair but not compelling 1 1 0
(g) Offer is reasonable but not compelling 5 0 5 (1)*
45 McDonald L, Moodie G, Ramsay I and Wester J, Experts’ Reports in Corporate Transactions (Federation Press, 2003) p 3.
46 For example, United Kingdom, Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global
Banking Crisis (London, March 2009) pp 39-40: “The predominant assumption behind financial market regulation – in the US,
the UK and increasing across the world – has been that financial markets are capable of becoming both efficient and rational and
that a key goal of the financial market regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce inefficient and illiquid
markets … In the face of the worst financial crisis for a century, however, the assumptions of efficient market theory have been
subject to increasingly effective criticism …”
47 The shareholder circulars were accessed from http://www.sgx.com last viewed 27 July 2011. Only independent financial
adviser opinions issued in connection with takeover offers under the Takeover Code, r 7 are included in Table 1. (Other
situations where financial advisers are appointed are not included in Table 1. For example, if the bidder requires the approval of
the shareholders to make an offer because it is a major transaction under Ch 10 of the Listing Manual, or it is a related party
transaction under Ch 9 of the Listing Manual, a financial adviser and independent financial adviser may be appointed in
connection therewith but their opinions (if any) are not included in Table 1, as Table 1 only deals with the Takeover Code
requirement for independent financial advice.) Whether shareholders’ circulars were issued in connection with takeover offers
under the Takeover Code, r 7 (including reverse takeovers) was determined manually, as there is no specific search engine in
connection therewith. Where the offers were revised, and separate independent financial adviser opinions are issued for the offer
and the revised offer, both independent financial adviser opinions are counted for the purposes of Table 1. Takeover transactions
involving REITs and business trusts are excluded.
48 The sources included searches from the listed company’s websites, filings with the SGX under company announcements,
filings in ThomsonOne Banker and press reports.
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TABLE 1 continued
Conclusions reached by independent financial advisers 2008 2009 2010
(h) Offer is attractive 2 (1)* 0 0
(i) Offer is not attractive 0 1 2
(j) Offer is compelling 0 1 0
(k) Offer is not compelling 2 2 0
(l) Offer is not attractive and not compelling 0 0 2
(m) Shareholders should accept the offer 1 (1)* 0 0
(n) The conclusion does not fall within clauses (a) to (m) above;
instead, reference is made to the diverse investment horizons of
shareholders. (For example, the opinion provides that the offer is
a reasonable short-term exit opportunity for shareholders to
immediately realise their investment and/or long-term sharehold-
ers or shareholders who are optimistic about their equity
investments in the company may wish to reject the offer or sell
their shares in the market.)
7 2 2
Sub-total 37 23 34
Reverse takeovers and capital raising transactions giving rise to whitewash waivers
(a) Transaction (giving rise to the whitewash waiver) is fair
and/or reasonable and not prejudicial to the independent
shareholders
1 0 3
(b) Whitewash resolution is not prejudicial to the independent
shareholders (without specifically evaluating whether the
transaction is fair and/or reasonable)
5 15 11
(c) Advise directors to recommend to independent shareholders to
vote in favour of the whitewash resolution
3 0 0
Sub-total 9 15 14
Total 46 38 48
* The number in parenthesis represents the exit offers only.
Sources: Author’s analysis of the conclusions reached by independent financial advisers in the
independent financial adviser opinions disclosed to shareholders of companies listed on the SGX
which are subject to takeover offers during the relevant period.
The valuation problem
Lack of objective standards and equivocal independent financial adviser conclusions
As can be seen from Table 1, in the majority of the evaluations of takeover offers, the “fair and
reasonable” test is used, and for whitewash waivers which are sought, the absence of prejudice to
independent shareholders test is used. On occasions, for takeovers, independent financial advisers have
opined that the offer price is “fair” only or is “reasonable” only. However, there are many situations
where advisers have departed from the “fair and reasonable” test and have come to conclusions which
are more equivocal. In the second half of 2009, the SGX specifically imposed a requirement that
advisers’ opinions rendered in exit offers must be clear and unequivocal.49 However, this requirement
is confined to opinions rendered in exit offers and does not apply to the other transactions.
It is not clear why a plethora of standards are used. Most of these takeovers offers are not
complicated and the majority involve cash offers, except in the case of reverse takeovers. The
49 Singapore Exchange, n 24.
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independent financial advisers have not clearly explained why they are not using the standard of “fair
and reasonable” and it is often unclear if there are differences among the tests of “attractive”,
“compelling” or “reasonable but not compelling” and “fair and reasonable”. In some instances, the
advice in (g) of Table 1 is also qualified by diverse investment horizons of the shareholders which are
found in (n). It is submitted that references to diverse investment horizons are unhelpful in assisting a
shareholder to decide whether to accept the offer or vote on a proposal and are likely to be the reason
that the SGX expressly disallows such recommendation for an exit offer. In these instances,
independent financial advisers have not explained why they are unable to give unequivocal
recommendations.
The lack of uniformity in the standards of review is to be contrasted with the United Kingdom50
and Hong Kong,51 where there is either a market practice or a regulatory requirement for independent
financial advisers to use the “fair and reasonable” test. In Australia, there are only three tests that can
be used:
• the “fair and reasonable” test;
• the “fair value” test; and
• the “in the best interest of members of the company” test,
depending on the type of transaction in question.52
Substantial discretion in choosing methodologies and assumptions
In addition to the lack of uniformity in the standard of review, independent financial advisers do not
clearly explain why particular methodologies were chosen as appropriate when assessing the takeover
offers. Based on a review of the opinions in Table 1, advisers have used one or more of the following
methodologies:
• market-based methods that estimate the company’s market value by considering the market price
of the transactions in its shares or the market value of comparable companies;
• asset-based methods such as net asset value; and
• discounted cash flow analysis.
There are, of course, other possible methodologies in assessing the offer, even when a “fair and
reasonable” test is used. For example, if the acquisition creates unique gains with a particular party,
the independent financial adviser may decide that the fair and reasonable price should reflect the
company as a stand-alone entity plus a portion of the gains resulting from the acquisition. In a
privatisation transaction by controlling shareholders, the adviser could decide that a fair and
reasonable price should reflect the discount ascribed to the value of minority shareholding.
50 In the United Kingdom, for recommended offers, the form of wording which is generally accepted as discharging the
obligation under rr 3.1 and 25.1(a) of the United Kingdom’s City Code on Takeovers and Mergers is: “The directors, who have
been so advised by [Adviser], consider the terms of the offer to be fair and reasonable. In providing advice to the directors,
[Adviser] has taken into account the directors’ commercial assessments. Accordingly, the directors recommend that shareholders
accept the offer.” The United Kingdom Takeover Panel has stated that it considers it to be “in the best interests of shareholders,
companies and advisers to have an objective standard for the advice” given by independent financial advisers. The qualification
“in providing advice to the directors the financial adviser has taken into account the directors’ commercial assessment” is the
only qualification allowed, in the absence of exceptional circumstances. See Takeover Panel, Annual Report for the Year Ended
31 March 1997, p 14.
51 Hong Kong, n 29, r 2.1.
52 The “fair and reasonable” test is used in takeover bids where the bidder’s voting power is 30% or more or where there is
common directorship between the bidder and the target. In such a case, the target statement must include, or be accompanied by,
a report by an expert that states whether, in the expert’s opinion, the takeover offer is “fair and reasonable”, and the reasons for
forming that opinion: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 640. The “fair value” is used in compulsory acquisition situations:
(i) where a bidder which has reached 90% of a class of shares in a takeover bid is required to proceed immediately to offer to
acquire any securities convertible into shares of that class (ss 663A, 663B(1)(c)(ii) and 667A); (ii) where the holder of 90% of
the shares of a class seeks compulsory acquisition of the remaining shares of that class (ss 664A(3), 664C(2)(b)(ii) and 667A);
and (iii) where the holder of 100% of the shares is required to offer to acquire all shares of other classes convertible into shares
of that class (ss 665A, 665B(1)(c)(ii) and 667A). For a scheme of arrangement, the test is whether the transaction is “in the best
interest of the members of the company the subject of the scheme”: Corporations Regulation 2001 (Cth), reg 5.1.01 and Sch 8,
cll 8303 and 8306.
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Conversely, the adviser could take the view that a fair and reasonable price should include a premium
because minority shareholders will be deprived of their right to enjoy any upside when their shares are
compulsorily acquired. In fact, many of the recent controversial privatisations in Singapore that took
place during the financial crisis or immediately thereafter were proposed when their share prices were
at historically low levels but the target companies had viable businesses, and it was expected that
controllers would relist them again at substantially higher valuations.53 In these cases, offering a slight
premium over the trading prices does not necessarily mean that the offer is “fair and reasonable”.
There is currently no standard-setting body or standards applicable to assessing valuation that are
akin to the Accounting Standards Council for setting accounting standards. As a result, independent
financial advisers have substantial discretion in determining what methodologies and assumptions to
use.54 Advisers get to pick the appropriate comparable transactions. Discounted cash flow analysis,
which discounts the company’s future cash flow to a net present value, is often inherently subjective
because of the requirements to estimate cash flows for all of the following years and to make
judgment calls on the appropriate discount rate to apply to the cash flow.55
No independent verification
A review of the independent financial advisers’ opinions in Table 1 showed that they were not
expected to independently verify information provided by target management. In fact, in most of the
opinions, the advisers stated that they relied on publicly available information and, insofar as
information was obtained from the target board, it was assumed that the target board had provided
complete, true and accurate information in all material respects. Unlike United States-style fairness
opinions, there is no market practice for independent financial advisers to either evaluate financial
projections and forecast information prepared by target management (unless the target board chooses
to disclose profit forecasts which would be subject to separate reporting)56 or to consider estimated
synergistic savings arising from the transaction.57
Independence
The main rules on regulating the independence of independent financial advisers are found in the
Takeover Code and practice statements issued by the Securities Industry Council, common law rules
on preserving confidentiality of information58 and the regulatory licensing framework to which
53 Two often cited examples are Want Want Holdings, a Singapore company with principal operations in Taiwan, which was
delisted in 2007 from the SGX and was subsequently relisted in Hong Kong in 2008 and traded at a price earnings ratio of about
26.7 times in Hong Kong, compared with 10 to 15 times in Singapore; and Man Wah Holdings, which was delisted in 2008 from
the SGX and had a market capitalisation of less than S$200 million and was subsequently relisted in Hong Kong with a market
capitalisation of S$1.2 billion: see Yang H, “More S-chips May Delist”, Straits Times (31 August 2009); and Khoo L, “More
Privatisations as Valuations Ease”, Business Times (6 September 2010).
54 See Lee, n 5 (interviews with independent financial advisers who argue that, in the current weak investment climate, an exit
offer, even if the price is below the company’s net asset value, may still be “reasonable”).
55 Gaughan PA, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructurings (4th ed, 2007) pp 535-555.
56 Takeover Code, r 25. An illustrative example would be the privatisation of Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd, a
Singapore company which was dual-listed on the SGX and NASDAQ in 2009. Separate opinions from Chartered’s financial
advisers and the independent financial adviser (required under the Takeover Code) were disclosed to shareholders. A comparison
of the terms of reference in the fairness and independent financial adviser opinions shows that the financial advisers issuing the
fairness opinions reviewed the financial projections and forecast information but the independent financial adviser explicitly
excluded a review of such projections or forecast information. See Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing, Scheme Document
(9 October 2009, copy on file with author).
57 For example, in connection with Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of Gillette in 2005, one contentious issue raised was whether
the fairness opinions issued in connection with the merger took into account the appropriate cost synergies. See Sorkin AR,
“You Can Call It a Fairness Opinion, But That Wouldn’t be Fair”, New York Times (10 July 2005). For the expected scope of
work of a financial adviser issuing a fairness opinion in United States transactions, see Lipton and Steinberger, n 32 at [11.02].
58 Generally, Takeover Code, r 7, would cover most of the situations where an adviser would be prohibited from acting at
common law. For example, a proposed adviser cannot act as independent financial adviser for the target if it possesses
confidential information about the bidder by reason of having previously acted as financial adviser for the bidder; in such a case,
the obligation of confidentiality continues even though the retainer has ended: Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222. This is
addressed in Takeover Code, r 7.3, n 2.
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advisers, as entities licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore,59 are subject. There are two
requirements of independence. First, the independent financial adviser must be independent of the
bidder. Rule 7.3 of the Takeover Code disqualifies an adviser as acting as independent financial adviser
where it is in the same group as the professional adviser to the bidder or has a significant interest in or
financial connection with the bidder so as to create a conflict of interest. The bidder should not
influence the appointment of the independent financial adviser, which is within the sole purview of the
independent directors.60
Secondly, the independent financial adviser must be independent from the target company. For
management buy-outs, the independence of the adviser must be beyond question.61 Fees which are
contingent on the offer not being successful will compromise independence under the Takeover
Code.62 An adviser who has a financial or other connection with the target or has any pending business
dealing in the last two years will need to convince the Securities Industry Council that they should be
regarded as independent.63
The overwhelming majority of the opinions reviewed in Table 1 stated that the advisers had not
participated in the negotiations of the target leading up to the takeover offer or in advising the target of
the merits or efficacy of the takeover offer. However, there remains the problem of the inherent bias of
an independent financial adviser towards writing an opinion that is consistent with the views of the
board of the hiring company or its controlling shareholder. The bias does not arise only because the
target board pays for the adviser’s opinion. The bias exists because of the adviser’s hopes of rendering
other professional services to the company (an existing client) or its controlling shareholder or to some
other companies on whose boards the directors of the target board may sit in the future.64 Also, an
adviser who regularly issues opinions that the offer is not fair and reasonable will soon find that it has
little business. It is also not practicable to have a moratorium which prohibits the adviser from doing
future business as its client may wish to engage the adviser on the basis of its demonstrable good
work.65
It may be argued that good independent financial advisers have interests in safeguarding their
reputation, and they will not render biased opinions. Certainly, the independence requirements under
the current regulation and their interests in preserving their reputation will reduce instances in which
advisers accept appointments despite obvious conflicts of interests. However, these factors will not
completely eliminate the inherent bias, and such bias is not easily detectable since advisers possess
substantial discretion in picking the methodologies and assumptions and do not independently verify
information provided. An independent financial adviser who decides to write an opinion that is
pro-target board or its controlling shareholders only needs to ensure that it avoids writing a blatantly
biased opinion.66 Hence, it becomes important to consider the private enforcement actions by
59 Independent financial advisers provide corporate finance advice and must hold a capital markets services licence, unless
specifically exempted from the requirement to do so under s 99 of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing) (such as banks or
merchant banks). Section 123 of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing) sets out the power of the Monetary Authority of
Singapore to make regulations which require a capital markets services licence holder to take steps to avoid any conflict of
interest.
60 See Singapore, Securities Industry Council, n 9.
61 Takeover Code, r 7.1, n 1.
62 Takeover Code, r 7.3, n 3.
63 Singapore, Securities Industry Council, n 9.
64 A review of circulars in Table 1 shows that, in some instances, the independent financial adviser expressly states in its opinion
that it may seek to provide services to the bidder, the target and their concert parties (in the future) and it expects to receive fees
in connection therewith. See Bebchuk L and Kahan M, “Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can be Done about
It” (1989) Duke LJ 27 at 41-43.
65 In Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165 the majority of the High Court of Australia held that the
independent expert was not in a conflict of interest position even though there were past dealings between the independent
expert and certain of the directors of the client and the hope of future dealings was not sufficient to support a finding of conflict.
66 Bebchuk and Kahan, n 64 at 44.
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shareholders as the incentives of advisers to write unbiased opinions may be more aligned with
shareholders if they can be held liable for their opinions.
Lack of meaningful private enforcement measures for shareholders
This section argues that there is a lack of meaningful private enforcement measures for shareholders
or investors against independent financial advisers’ opinions for failings in care and expertise, honesty
or independence, whether under common law or legislation.
A few preliminary observations are made. The independent financial adviser’s opinion, as an
opinion, is not in itself false or misleading or deceptive, even if it turns out to be inaccurate.67
However, the opinion is misleading if misleading information is provided, such as stating that the
valuation is made on a certain basis but that is in fact not the case.68 By giving the opinion, the adviser
is also conveying that the opinion is honestly held, on rational grounds involving the application of the
relevant expertise.69 Accordingly, the opinion would be regarded as false or misleading if the adviser
gives an opinion that it does not genuinely hold or an opinion that is not based on rational grounds.
Where the adviser relies on a valuation report provided by a third party but disagrees with the basis of
such valuation, it would be misleading to issue an unqualified negative assurance statement that
nothing has come to its attention which causes the adviser to believe that the assumptions are not
reasonable.70 It would also be misleading or deceptive if the adviser holds itself out as independent
when it is not in fact the case.
Liability at common law
Under the tort of deceit, the plaintiff must establish that the false or misleading statement, being a
representation of fact, was made by the defendant, the statement was made fraudulently, the defendant
intended the plaintiff to rely on the statement and the statement actually induced the plaintiff to rely on
it.71 Shareholders suing an independent financial adviser in the tort of deceit for having issued a false
or misleading opinion face two significant difficulties. First, it was established in Derry v Peek (1889)
14 App Cas 337 that a statement is fraudulent only if the maker makes a representation, knowing it to
be false or without belief in its truth or is reckless as to whether it is true or false, intending the
plaintiff to act on it. There is no fraudulent misrepresentation if the maker believes that the
representation is true, even if the belief is unreasonable. A high burden of proof is required,72 and
allegations of fraud must be supported with particulars, and cannot be pleaded generally.73 Secondly,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant had made the false or misleading statements for the specific
purpose of inducing the specific plaintiff to enter into the transaction.74 As an independent financial
67 At common law, only statements of fact and not opinions or statements of future intention are actionable and it is only if that
opinion or intention is not honestly held that the law intervenes: Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) LR 29 Ch D 459.
68 In Australia, independent experts have been found to have provided misleading information in their reports. For example,
Carr Boyd Minerals v Queen Margaret Gold Mines (1989) 7 ACLC 1029 (expert report containing a number of matters or items
of information that were misleading in the form and context in which they appeared; the report valued the main asset of the
defendants at A$80 million but less than three months earlier, the same expert valued the assets at A$60 million); Tonville Pty
Ltd v Stokes (A/asia) Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 449 (expert report stated that the valuation of all assets had been made by an open
market value for existing use basis but the value of the plant had been made on a different basis and it was found that the expert
report was misleading).
69 See Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553 at 559. See also Reiffel v ACN 075 839 266 Ltd (2003) 132 FCR 437, citing Escott
v BarChris Construction Corp 283 F Supp 643 (1968) that the expert was conveying that “he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, … that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading”.
70 Reiffel v ACN 075 839 266 Ltd (2003) 132 FCR 437 (conduct was considered misleading and deceptive under s 52 of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)).
71 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205. See also Cartwright J, Misrepresentation,
Mistake and Non-disclosure (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at [5.05].
72 Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247.
73 Rules of Court (Sing), O 18, r 8.
74 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205. See also Cartwright, n 71. at [5.19].
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adviser’s opinion prepared in the course of a takeover is usually addressed to the independent
directors, and almost never to the shareholders, it would be difficult for the shareholders to prove that
the false or misleading statements were made by the adviser to induce them (shareholders) to either
reject or accept the takeover offer.
If fraud cannot be proved, shareholders may wish to bring claims in negligence arising from an
adviser’s false or misleading opinion, such as for having an over-optimistic outlook that has led
shareholders to reject the offer, or having a pessimistic outlook that has led shareholders to accept an
offer that greatly under-values the target shares.75 An instance of the former occurred in Australia
arising from the hostile bid for GIO Australia by AMP in 1998; in that case, the report of the
independent expert appointed by GIO Australia valued the GIO Australia shares at a range that was
higher than the bid price. Nevertheless, the takeover succeeded and AMP acquired 57% of GIO
Australia. Subsequently, GIO Australia announced that its reinsurance business incurred substantial
losses, which led to a drastic fall in its share price. The remaining shares were later compulsorily
acquired by AMP at half of the price which was offered in the hostile bid. Certain shareholders of GIO
Australia brought claims against, among others, the independent expert, for the difference between the
takeover offer price in the bid and the compulsory acquisition price. They alleged that the expert owed
a duty of care to shareholders who relied on its report and failed to sell their shares to AMP in the
hostile bid. The action was eventually settled.76
Bidders may also wish to bring claims against the independent financial adviser for having relied
on its opinion in making or raising their bid. This occurred in Morgan Crucible v Hill Samuel & Co
[1991] Ch 295 (Morgan Crucible) where the bidder sued, among others, the financial advisers to the
target, for statements made in the defence documents which led to the bidder raising its bid and
ultimately successfully completing the acquisition. The bidder argued that the target advisers owed a
duty of care to it (which was known to the bidder at the time the statements were made), and the
bidder had subsequently raised the bid, relying on those statements. The application to strike out the
action failed, on the ground that it was at least arguable as to whether the target advisers intended the
bidder to rely on the pre-bid statements for the purpose of deciding whether to make an increased bid.
However, Morgan Crucible must be read in light of Partco v Wragg [2002] EWCA Civ 594, which
held that there must be an objective form of assumption of responsibility in order to hold that a
director of a target company owes a duty of care to a bidder for statements that he made in the course
of the takeover. Mere supply of information pursuant to the applicable takeover code or listing rules,
without more, is not sufficient to establish an assumption of responsibility required for the purpose of
establishing the requisite duty of care.
There is no direct Singapore case law on shareholders or bidders bringing tortious actions against
an independent financial adviser in respect of its misstatements made in takeover documents.
Reference may be made to the general test for establishing duty of care in negligence. For a duty of
care to arise, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Spandeck Engineering v Defence Science Technology
Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (Spandeck Engineering) held that there is a two-stage test of proximity
and policy consideration, qualified by the threshold of foreseeability. Proximity consists of causal,
circumstantial and physical proximity, and the twin criteria of voluntary assumption of responsibility
and reliance.77 The test is to be applied incrementally, that is, with reference to decided cases in
75 This may occur for privatisations where the independent financial adviser is unduly influenced by the wishes of the controlling
shareholders seeking to take the listed company private.
76 King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings) [2003] FCA 980; King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd
(2000) 100 FCR 209. Claims were also brought for deceptive and misleading conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth),
s 52, or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth), s 12DA, the Fair Trading Act 1987 (Cth), s 42
and the repealed Corporations Law, s 995.
77 Spandeck Engineering v Defence Science Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 replaces the test for duty of care in
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (Caparo). Caparo has held that the test for duty of care is the three-part test
based on “foreseeability” of damage, “proximity” of relationship and that the situation is one which the court considers it “fair,
just and reasonable”. Caparo involved the scope of the duty of care owed by auditors in respect of statutory accounts and the
House of Lords held that the purpose of the statutory accounts was to enable the shareholders as a whole to monitor the
management of the company by directors and to decide how to exercise their powers in general meeting, and not to enable them
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analogous situations. Voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance are regarded as two sides of
the same coin78 and they remain important factors in cases involving pure economic loss, as shown in
later decisions.79 Given that the independent financial adviser’s opinion is addressed to the
independent directors of the target, and the adviser expressly disclaims responsibilities to any third
party, it is unlikely that the courts will hold that there is any voluntary assumption of responsibility of
the adviser to the individual shareholders (or other investors).
It may be argued that there is an assumption of responsibility because the independent financial
adviser knows that shareholders or identified bidders are likely to rely on the adviser’s opinion, and
the adviser would have consented to the inclusion of its name and opinion being published in the
circular that is addressed to shareholders80 and published in the securities markets. However, this
argument is unlikely to succeed in light of Partco v Wragg, which held that mere compliance with the
applicable takeover code or listing rules does not amount to an assumption of responsibility. Given
that the independent financial adviser’s opinion is only disclosed to shareholders and published in the
securities market pursuant to the market practice and Takeover Code, it is unlikely that the Singapore
court will find that there is an objective assumption of responsibility by the adviser to any individual
shareholder or bidder.
Of course, the target company which has engaged the independent financial adviser may bring an
action against the adviser for negligence or breach of contract but normally the target would not have
suffered any loss arising from a false or misleading adviser’s opinion. Any losses are suffered by the
shareholders who have relied on the adviser’s opinion in dealing (or not dealing) with their shares.
Civil liability under the Securities and Futures Act
Under the Securities and Futures Act (Sing), Cap 289 (2006 rev ed), contravention of the prohibition
on certain types of market misconduct may result in liability for statutory compensation under ss 234
and 236. In connection with rendering misleading independent financial advisers’ opinions, the
relevant provisions in the Securities and Futures Act are ss 199, 200 and 201 (market misconduct
provisions).81 Section 199 prohibits the making of a statement that is false or misleading in a material
particular and which is likely to induce other persons to subscribe for securities, to induce the sale or
purchase of securities, or to have the effect of raising, lowering, maintaining or stabilising the market
price of securities. Section 200 prohibits, inter alia, the making of a statement, promise or forecast that
is misleading in order to induce another to deal in securities. Section 201(b) is the catch-all provision
which prohibits, inter alia, a person from directly or indirectly, in connection with the subscription,
purchase or sale of any securities, engaging in any act, practice or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deception or making a false statement or misleading omission of material facts.
In relation to the mental requirement under the market misconduct provisions, ss 199 and 200
impose liability on the basis of fraud, recklessness or negligence.82 Section 201(b) is silent on whether
fault is required, and it is an open question as to whether the provision creates strict liability.83
individually or as investors to make investment decisions. Accordingly, reliance on the statutory accounts was not reasonable as
it was not consistent with the purpose for which the statement was made. Shareholders were not bringing the claim in that case.
Cf Galoo Ltd v Bright Grahame Murray [1994] 1 WLR 1360, where the English Court of Appeal held that there was proximity
between the target companies’ auditors and the new controlling shareholder in the target companies where the auditors knew
that the audited accounts were used as a basis to value the deferred takeover consideration for the shares.
78 Spandeck Engineering v Defence Science Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 at [81].
79 For example, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 540.
80 Takeover Code, r 24.1(c).
81 Sections 199 and 200 of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing) are based on the now repealed Australian Corporations Law
(Cth), ss 999 and 1000 respectively. Section 201 of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing) is similar to s 995(2) of the Australian
Corporations Law (Cth) and is in pari materia with r 10b-5, promulgated under s 10 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US):
17 CFR s 240.10b-5 (2005) (r 10b-5).
82 In relation to the mental requirement under s 199 of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing): (i) s 199(i) requires the maker of
the statement either to have knowledge that the statement or information is false or misleading in a material particular or is
reckless as to whether the statement or information is true; and (ii) s 199(ii) requires the maker to “know or ought reasonably to
have known” of the falsity or misleading nature of the information. In PP v Wang Ziyi Able [2008] 2 SLR(R) 61, it was held that
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As against a person who contravenes a market misconduct provision, s 234 of the Securities and
Futures Act permits a person who has traded “contemporaneously with the contravention”
(contemporaneous trader) to claim losses against such contravening person, and these losses are
statutorily (and conclusively) presumed to be the difference between the price at which the
contemporaneous trader dealt in the securities and the price at which the securities would have been
traded “if the contravention had not occurred”. Section 234 applies irrespective of whether the
contravening person has been convicted or has a civil penalty imposed. Alternatively, pursuant to
s 236 of the Securities and Futures Act, a contemporaneous trader may also prove claims for
compensation against a person convicted of an offence under a market misconduct provision. The
amount of compensation is the amount that the claimant would be entitled to claim had the claimant
proceeded under s 234 or a pro rata portion of the maximum recoverable amount, whichever is
lower.84
There are many difficulties in private enforcement under s 234 or s 236 which the current author
has discussed in an earlier work.85 In summary, the most significant difficulties are the lack of clarity
as to who are regarded as contemporaneous traders and the overall ceiling on the maximum
recoverable sum, pegged to the amount of profit that the contravening person has gained or the loss
avoided, less compensation that is ordered to be paid to other claimants in respect of the same
contravention.86 For an independent financial adviser who has contravened a market misconduct
provision, it appears that its only liability under s 234 or s 236 will be the fees that are charged by the
adviser for the work done less expenses, being the profit that is gained. Since the provisions of the
statutory compensation scheme came into force in 2002, there has not yet been a single reported claim
under s 234 or s 236. It is also not clear whether express disclaimers of liability to shareholders, which
are usually included in the adviser’s opinions, will be effective, in claims under s 234 or s 236.87
This does not mean that an independent financial adviser will not face any consequences in
issuing a false or misleading opinion. The adviser will face a loss of reputation. Breach of a market
(i) the first limb of s 199(ii) requires actual and subjective knowledge of the false or misleading nature of the statement being
disseminated; (ii) the second limb of s 199(ii) requires objective constructive knowledge directed against negligence; and
(iii) s 199(i) requires the mental state of not caring whether the statement or information is true or false, which requires some
subjective dishonesty on the part of the contravening person and is akin to the concept of subjective recklessness found in Derry
v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337. In effect, s 199 imposes liability for fraud, recklessness or negligence.
In relation to the mental requirement under s 200(1)(a) and (c) of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing) (the other subsections
are not relevant here), they prohibit the dissemination of false or misleading information to induce or attempt to induce another
to deal in securities by (i) the making or publishing of any statement, promise or forecast that the maker knows or ought
reasonably to have known to be misleading, false or deceptive; and (ii) the reckless making or publishing of any statement,
promise or forecast that is misleading, false or deceptive. Using the analysis in PP v Wang Ziyi Able [2008] 2 SLR(R) 61, (i) the
first limb of s 200(1)(a) requires actual and subjective knowledge that the statement, promise or forecast is misleading, false or
deceptive; and (ii) the second limb of s 200(1)(a) requires objective constructive knowledge directed against negligence; and
(iii) s 201(1)(c) requires subjective recklessness.
83 In Donald v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2000) 104 FCR 126, it was held that s 995(2) of the repealed
Australian Corporations Law (which is similar to s 201(b) of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing)) does not require a mental
element. Cf Tjio H, Principles and Practice of Securities Regulation in Singapore (2nd ed, LexisNexis, 2010) p 598, who noted
that United States cases (Ernst & Ernst v Hochfielder 425 US 185 (1976)) interpreting r 10b-5 required a scienter requirement
but said that it was unlikely that s 201 would require scienter.
84 While the market misconduct provisions are largely derived from the repealed Australian Corporations Law, the enforcement
provisions under ss 234 and 236 of the Securities and Futures Act (Sing) are not.
85 See Wan WY, “Civil Liabilities for False or Misleading Statements Made by Listed Companies to the Securities Market in
Singapore” (2008) 26 C&SLJ 377.
86 This assumes that the independent financial adviser has no significant shareholding in the target, as it would not otherwise be
regarded as able to act as an independent financial adviser under the Takeover Code.
87 In Australia, it has been argued that disclaimers are unlikely to be effective as a means to avoid civil liability for misleading
or deceptive conduct under s 1041I of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which creates civil liability for making a false or
misleading statement or engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct: see McDonald et al, n 45, p 161.
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misconduct provision can lead to criminal liability or a civil penalty order.88 The Securities Industry
Council may impose ex post sanctions on the independent financial adviser who fails to issue
documents that meet the requisite standard of care, in breach of the Takeover Code.89 Regulatory
action may also be taken against independent financial advisers by the Monetary Authority of
Singapore. However, the fact remains that, while the threat of private enforcement can complement
public oversight and enforcement in ensuring that independent financial advisers act prudently and
objectively, the chances of an adviser actually being sued successfully for substantial damages are
very small. Possible reforms are discussed below.
INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL ADVISERS’ OPINIONS IN RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
Related party transactions entered into by the listed company (whether Singapore or foreign company)
are governed under Ch 9 of the Listing Manual.90 Chapter 9 provides that transactions between the
listed issuer91 and its interested person92 require disclosure and/or approval of shareholders depending
on the applicable thresholds. Where the amount is equivalent to at least 5% of the listed company’s
net tangible asset value, shareholder approval is required,93 and the independent financial adviser
appointed is required to evaluate whether the transaction is on normal commercial terms and is not
prejudicial to the interests of the company and its minority shareholders.94 The independence of the
independent financial adviser is determined by the SGX.
As in the case of takeovers, independent financial advisers’ opinions rendered for related party
transactions have important informational and shareholder protection roles. These transactions present
potential opportunities for the expropriation of private benefits by controlling shareholders at the
expense of minority shareholders, making the need for an independent professional analysis
important.95 In fact, in these cases, the policy is that for significant transactions, the decision is taken
out of the hands of the board and lies entirely in the hands of the independent shareholders.
Two observations may be made. First, in assessing whether the transaction is on normal
commercial terms, it is expected that a comparison with arm’s length transactions of third parties in
the relevant market is required. There is a further test, that is, the transaction must be one which is
“not prejudicial to the interests of the listed company and its minority shareholders”. It is not clear
whether this test is the same as a “fair and reasonable” test. It could be argued that in a transaction
where a company is selling an asset to its controlling shareholder and receiving consideration that is
less than the value of the asset sold, there is in fact no material prejudice to the company or its
88 Infringement may also result in the defendant incurring criminal liability (a maximum fine of S$250,000 and/or seven years’
imprisonment (for an individual) and a maximum fine of S$500,000 (for a corporation)) or civil pecuniary sanction (three times
the amount of profit gained or loss avoided, subject to a minimum sum of S$50,000 for an individual and S$100,000 for a
corporation): Securities and Futures Act (Sing), ss 212 and 232.
89 Takeover Code, r 8.2.
90 Where the listed company is a Singapore company, it will also have to comply with the requirements in the Companies Act
on disclosures of interests in transactions (s 156) and restrictions on granting of loans to directors’ connected persons, and the
giving of a guarantee or security in connection with such loans (ss 162 and 163).
91 Transactions entered into by the company’s unlisted subsidiary or unlisted associated company which the listed group or the
listed group and its interested persons control are also subject to Ch 9.
92 Under Ch 9, an “interested person” is (i) a director, chief executive officer, or controlling shareholder of the listed company;
or (ii) an associate of any such director, chief executive officer or controlling shareholder. A controlling shareholder is one who
holds 15% or more of the company or in fact exercises control of the company.
93 Transactions below S$100,000 are excluded: r 906. There are also numerous exceptions set out in rr 915 and 916, including
payment of dividend.
94 Chapter 9 also allows a listed company to obtain a mandate from its shareholders for recurrent interested person transactions
of a revenue or trading nature or for those necessary for its day-to-day operations. In such a case, the independent financial
adviser will opine on whether the methods and procedures in determining the transaction prices are sufficient to ensure that the
transactions will be carried out on normal commercial terms and will not be prejudicial to the interests of the company and its
minority shareholders.
95 Where shareholder approval is sought for Ch 9 transactions, the interested person and associates cannot vote: Listing Manual,
r 919.
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minority shareholders because the asset is not otherwise easily saleable. Secondly, it is an open
question as to whether an independent financial adviser is expected to independently verify the
documents and information provided by the company.
There is, however, one important difference between independent financial advisers’ opinions
issued for related party transactions and for takeover offers. In the former situation, independent
financial advisers will be liable to their clients under the contract of engagement. Accordingly, a client
company should be able to sue either in contract or tort law if the adviser failed to warn the
independent directors or the shareholders as to the prejudicial nature of the transaction to the company,
thereby causing the company not to take steps to avoid entering into the transaction. There is yet no
Singapore authority but this issue arose in Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165. In
that case, Kia Ora made a share exchange offer with a cash component for another company, Western.
Kia Ora engaged NW, the independent expert, to prepare a report on Western and NW said in the
report (to Kia Ora) that the price proposed to be paid for the Western shares was fair and reasonable.96
The acquisition was completed but was disastrous for Kia Ora, which subsequently went into
liquidation. In the action by the liquidators of Kia Ora against NW for breach of duty of care owed to
Kia Ora under the contract of retainer or tort law, the majority of the High Court of Australia held that
Kia Ora was entitled to recover the cash component of its offer as damages.97 Significantly, the High
Court also held that NW did not owe any fiduciary duties to Kia Ora.
In many of these cases, the controversial question is whether the independent financial adviser
may plead contributory negligence to reduce its liability to its client company, where the company’s
directors have acted fraudulently or carelessly in causing the company to enter into the detrimental
related party transaction. Companies and their shareholders would be concerned that the adviser can
reduce its liability since the very purpose of appointing the adviser is to, inter alia, prevent the
company from entering into an unfavourable transaction which is detrimental to the company.
Singapore and Australian cases have considered this issue in the context of auditor and
independent expert liabilities respectively. In JSI Shipping v Teefoongwonglcloong [2007] 4 SLR(R)
460 and PlanAssure PAC v Gaelic Inns [2007] 4 SLR(R) 513, the Singapore Court of Appeal allowed
the auditor’s liability for damages claimed by its client arising from the negligent audit to be
substantially reduced where the management of the company was also negligent.98 In Duke Group Ltd
v Pilmer (1999) 73 SASR 64, the Supreme Court of South Australia held that Kia Ora was vicariously
liable for the conduct of the directors for the purposes of finding contributory negligence on the part of
Kia Ora. The result was that Kia Ora could recover for its losses against NW (even though the
directors were acting fraudulently) but its damages were reduced substantially by reason of
contributory negligence.99
96 Pursuant to the listing rules of the Australian Stock Exchange, a listed company could not acquire (without the prior approval
of its shareholders in general meeting) securities the value of which, or the consideration for the acquisition of which, exceeded
5% of shareholders’ funds of the acquiring company. It applied if the vendor would be regarded as an associate of the listed
company for the purposes of s 9 of the Companies Act 1981 (Cth) or the equivalent provisions of a State Companies Code. ASX
Listing Rule 3J(3) applied to Kia Ora’s acquisition of Western United because there were common directors of and shareholders
in both companies.
97 Kia Ora was not entitled to recover damages in relation to the issuance of shares, and this aspect of the decision is
controversial. See Prentice DD and Nolan R, “The Issue of Shares – Compensating the Company for Loss” (2002) 118 LQR
180.
98 In JSI Shipping v Teefoongwonglcloong [2007] 4 SLR(R) 460, the reduction was made pursuant to the statutory relief from
liability under s 391 of the Companies Act which is in pari materia to the Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 1157 and the Companies
Act 1985 (UK), s 727, and the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1318. In PlanAssure PAC v Gaelic Inns [2007] 4
SLR(R) 513, the reduction was made pursuant to s 3(1) of the Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act (Sing), Cap
54 (2002 rev ed), which is in pari materia to the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK). Similar provisions can
be found in State legislation in Australia, eg Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW). Damages were reduced
by 50% in each case.
99 Damages in tort were reduced by 35%: Duke Group Ltd v Pilmer (1999) 73 SASR 64 at [658]. The issue of attribution of
fault by directors of a company was not considered before the appeal to the High Court of Australia.
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As to the company’s shareholders, it is clear that an independent financial adviser owes no duty in
contract or in tort to them. Further, if their claims are for losses arising from the fall in market value
of the shares, such claims are barred by the principles on reflective loss (as set out in Townsing Henry
George v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 597 and Johnson v Gore Wood & Co
[2002] 2 AC 1) as these losses are not losses of the shareholders but those of the company.100
Shareholders may have direct statutory claims against the independent financial adviser for
contravention of the market misconduct provisions if they fall into the class of plaintiffs within ss 234
and 236 of the Securities and Futures Act. However, there is very little hope of the shareholders
recovering substantial damages because of problems of enforcement, for the reasons explained above.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
There are three basic options for enhancing the quality and reliability of independent financial
advisers’ opinions to achieve the objectives set out above:
• implement a code of conduct to enhance the quality and reliability of independent financial
advisers’ opinions in takeovers and related party transactions;
• judicial review of the reasonableness of the assumptions and valuation methodologies in
independent financial advisers’ opinions; and
• having a meaningful private enforcement framework which allows shareholders to bring actions
against independent financial advisers for losses incurred as a result of relying on misleading
adviser opinions in takeovers.
Each of these options, which are not mutually exclusive, are considered in turn.
Code of conduct
In the absence of any self-regulatory body setting standards for preparing independent financial
advisers’ opinions, it is proposed that the Monetary Authority of Singapore issue a code of conduct
that applies to independent financial advisers appointed in corporate transactions.101 The code of
conduct would prescribe practices that enhance the quality of the adviser’s opinion but would not
prescribe specific methodologies or assumptions to be used since these are matters for the adviser. In
addition to the requirements of independence,102 the code of conduct would contain the following
matters in order to improve the quality of independent financial advisers’ opinions.
First, the code should specify that the independent financial adviser is to evaluate whether the
takeover offer is “fair and reasonable” to shareholders. This proposal will bring Singapore in line with
the practice in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Australia, which use the standard of “fair and
reasonable”.
The question arises as to whether the “fair and reasonable” test is a composite test or is
disjunctive. Market practice in the United Kingdom and regulation in Hong Kong treat “fair and
reasonable” as a composite test. However, in Australia, in situations where an independent expert
opinion is prepared in connection with a takeover transaction,103 the Regulatory Guides promulgated
by ASIC provide that the “fair and reasonable” test involves two distinct criteria.104 An offer is
regarded as “fair” if the value of the offer price is equal to or greater than the value of the securities
that are subject of the offer (assuming 100% ownership of the target). An offer is “reasonable” if it is
100 However, if the shareholders are claiming damages for the wasted costs in attending the shareholders’ meeting, such damages
would not be barred by the no-reflective loss principle since these damages are separate and distinct from the loss in value of the
shareholding.
101 Securities and Futures Act (Sing), s 321. A code of conduct is not put on statutory footing, so a breach thereof will not give
rise to criminal proceedings but such failure may be relied upon in civil or criminal proceedings as tending to establish or negate
liability: Securities and Futures Act (Sing), s 321(5).
102 The requirements in Singapore, Securities Industry Council, n 9, can be incorporated into the code of conduct.
103 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 640.
104 ASIC, Content of Expert Reports, Regulatory Guide 111 (March 2011). For a critique on treating “fair and reasonable” as
separate criteria, see Hulme SEK, “Section 640 of the Corporations Law: Independent Experts’ Reports and the RTZ Ltd
Takeover of Comalco Ltd” (2001) 19 C&SLJ 134.
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fair, but it may also be “reasonable” if, even though it is “unfair”, the expert believes that there are
sufficient reasons for the shareholders to accept the offer in the absence of any higher bid before the
close of the offer. Hence, there are only three combinations: “fair and reasonable”, “neither fair nor
reasonable” or “not fair but reasonable”. Australia also uses two other tests of “fair value” (in
compulsory acquisitions) and “best interests of the members of the company” (in schemes of
arrangement), though it appears that the latter term, “best interests”, is the same as “fair and
reasonable”.105 In Malaysia, the Securities Commission has broadly favoured the Australian position
for takeovers and regards “fair” and “reasonable” as two distinct criteria.106
On balance, the better view is to use the test of “fair and reasonable” but regard them as separate
criteria in evaluating takeover offers. The “fair and reasonable” test is by far the most common test
used by independent financial advisers, as shown in Table 1. “Fairness” will go towards the question
of valuation of the shares and the independent financial adviser will select the appropriate
methodologies and explain why they are chosen. “Reasonableness” will go towards the reasons for
accepting the offer or voting in favour for the transaction. An offer may be “not fair” but “reasonable”
for other reasons, such as the absence of any other offers or where the bidder has already obtained
majority control of the target and it is unlikely that there is another potential bidder. An offer which is
fair must be reasonable. Setting out the criteria for fairness and reasonableness will provide clarity to
the shareholders as to which are valuation and non-valuation factors that are taken into account by the
independent financial adviser.
The “fair and reasonable” test should apply to evaluations of all takeover offers, including reverse
takeovers and other transactions giving rise to whitewash waivers. In situations where only
independent shareholders are the subject of the offer (eg, where the controlling shareholder is seeking
to acquire the shares held by the independent shareholders or a reverse takeover where a whitewash
waiver is sought from the independent shareholders), the independent financial adviser only needs to
consider whether the offer is fair and reasonable to the independent shareholders (and not all
shareholders), since the decision to approve the transaction is only made by the independent
shareholders.
For related party transactions, it is submitted that there should be two limbs of assessment: first,
whether the transaction is on normal commercial terms and secondly, whether the transaction is “in the
interests of the company and its independent shareholders”. This second limb would replace the
existing “not prejudicial” test. Given that the decision on the transaction is put in the hands of the
independent shareholders, it is appropriate for the assessment to be made as to whether the transaction
is in the interests of the company and its independent shareholders.
Secondly, in the case of takeover offers, in addition to requiring the disclosure of assumptions and
methodologies used, the independent financial adviser should be expected to state a range of prices
which the adviser regards as fair.107 Independent directors and shareholders can determine whether the
price falls within the upper or lower range of prices that are “fair”. The range should be as narrow as
possible to be informative and meaningful.108 A review of the independent financial advisers’ opinions
in Table 1 shows that there is no practice of providing a range of prices.
Thirdly, the code of practice should set out the level of due diligence and investigation that is
expected of an independent financial adviser. An adviser should be expected to investigate the
accuracy of data about the company from those involved in the company if the evaluation is based on
such data. The adviser cannot merely assume that all the information given is accurate. While it is not
105 See n 52 and accompanying text. See also ASIC, n 104 at RG [111.19]-[111.23]: where the expert concludes that the proposal
is fair and reasonable if it was in the form of a takeover bid, the expert may conclude that it is in the best interests of the
members of the company.
106 Securities Commission of Malaysia, n 8 (28 January 2011).
107 In Australia, ASIC, n 104 at RG [111.78], provides that the expert should usually give a range of values. See also Re Pure
Resources 808 A 2d 421 (2002) where the Delaware court held that, in relation to the disclosure of the fairness opinion,
shareholders should know the basic valuation exercise, key assumptions and range of value under which the analysis is made.
108 See ASIC, n 104 at RG [111.79].
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expected that investigation should be at the level of a sponsor in an initial public offering, some
reasonable investigation should be conducted. Forecast information, projections and synergistic
benefits prepared by the target should not be the subject of review unless the target is prepared to
comply with the reporting procedures under r 25 of the Takeover Code due to the inherent unreliability
of such information.
Judicial review of reasonableness of the assumptions and valuation
methodologies
It is not envisaged that the proposed code of conduct will prescribe precise methodologies and
assumptions for evaluating transactions and these are matters to be decided by the independent
financial adviser. However, the courts should be willing to review the assumptions and methodologies
in an adviser’s opinion in the following situations:
• where it is alleged that shareholders are not given sufficient information to make a decision on the
transaction due to the provision of an adviser’s misleading or unhelpful opinion; and
• where the controlling shareholder, or a director in a management buy-out, is seeking to privatise
the target, and the adequacy of the consideration offered is in issue.
In the first situation, case law has held that the failure to provide full disclosure of relevant
information pursuant to the statutory equivalents of s 215109 or s 210110 of the Companies Act may
result in the court denying the compulsory acquisition or refusing to sanction the scheme respectively.
It is also well established that directors owe a duty to shareholders to disclose sufficient information
for them to make an informed decision about the proposals to be put before them in general
meeting.111 It is submitted that an adviser’s uninformative or misleading opinion, particularly when
relied upon by the independent directors without critical analysis, is relevant in determining whether
adequate information is provided to shareholders.
In the second situation where the controlling shareholder or an executive director is teaming up
with a financial sponsor to privatise the target, such a transaction is potentially coercive to the
minority dissenting shareholders who are forced to sell their shares and are deprived of any future
enjoyment of the upside in their investment. It is well established in English cases involving the
equivalent s 215 or s 210 that the receipt of the requisite acceptance or approval of the transaction is
a significant hurdle for a shareholder to overcome,112 and the onus is on the minority to establish that
there is some element of unfairness. The fact that the shareholders with no connection to the bidder
have accepted the price is a good indication that the price is fair, and it is a heavy burden for the
dissenting shareholders to show that the price is unfair.113
However, there is some limited support for a closer examination of the underlying analysis
contained in an independent financial adviser’s opinion where a bidder is relying on the opinion to
show that the offer price in a privatisation is fair. In Re PCCW [2009] HKCA 178, the Hong Kong
Court of Appeal had to consider whether to sanction a proposed scheme of arrangement where the
controlling shareholders were seeking to privatise the target company (PCCW) and the independent
shareholders would receive the scheme price as consideration. The independent financial adviser was
of the view that the terms of the scheme were “fair and reasonable” insofar as the independent
shareholders were concerned and the independent board committee agreed with the adviser. The
scheme was approved by the majority in number holding at least 75% of the shares but the dissenting
109 Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270; Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd [1992] BCLC 192.
110 For example, Re MB Group plc [1989] BCLC 672. The position in Singapore is largely similar: see Wah Yuen Electrical
Engineering v Singapore Cables Manufacturers [2003] 3 SLR 629 at 638.
111 See n 41.
112 For example, Re Hoare & Co [1933] All ER Rep 105; Re Press Caps [1949] Ch 434; Re Lifecare International plc [1990]
BCLC 222; Re BTR plc [1999] 2 BCLC 675 and on appeal, BTR plc (Leave to Appeal) [2000] 1 BCLC 740.
113 For example, see Re Britoil plc [1990] BCC 70.
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shareholders challenged the reliability of the statutory majority in number. The Court of Appeal
declined to sanction the scheme on the ground that there was evidence of widespread vote
manipulation.
However, Rogers VP, delivering the majority judgment, went further and observed that even
though the scheme price was at a premium to the prevailing market price, the scheme price was
substantially lower than the long-term historical share price or the offer prices in comparable
transactions. There was no good explanation as to why independent shareholders should sell at the
scheme price when the share price was at such a low level. The independent financial adviser’s
explanations for discounting comparable transactions and justifications for the scheme price were
found to be unpersuasive (at [83], [85]). While this is not a situation where the court refuses to
sanction the scheme on the sole basis that the price is unfair, this case illustrates the need for a closer
examination of the underlying analysis in the adviser’s opinion rendered for a transaction where the
existing controlling shareholders or the directors are seeking to acquire 100% of the target by cashing
out the minority shareholders. Re PCCW concerned a scheme of arrangement, but there is no reason
why the courts cannot perform a similar examination in an application to resist compulsory acquisition
under s 215 or an action for unfair prejudice or oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act.
Changing the statutory regime to allow shareholders to bring actions against
independent financial advisers for losses incurred as a result of relying on
their misleading opinions
There are two possible methods of allowing private enforcement by shareholders discussed here. First,
independent financial advisers could be appointed to advise shareholders directly. Secondly, the
Securities and Futures Act could be amended to allow for a meaningful enforcement framework which
allows shareholders to bring actions against independent financial advisers in appropriate situations.
Principal-agent relationship
In the United Kingdom, following Kraft’s controversial takeover of Cadbury in late 2009, it was
suggested that independent advisers be appointed to advise shareholders directly.114 However, this
suggestion was ultimately rejected by the Code Committee of the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers on
the grounds that it would result in the duplication of the work of the independent adviser who is
appointed by the independent directors and the additional costs would likely be borne by the target
company if not passed to shareholders. Further, the adviser appointed by the shareholders would only
have access to public information whereas the adviser appointed by the independent directors may
have access to non-public information of the target provided by the board. It is submitted that for the
reasons set out by the Code Committee, there is no real benefit to having two sets of independent
financial advisers advising the independent directors and shareholders respectively.
Securities and Futures Act
The analysis above demonstrates that:
1. an independent financial adviser is unlikely to be liable to shareholders in respect of a
fraudulently, recklessly or negligently prepared opinion issued in a takeover at common law. Even
though shareholders may theoretically have a claim under the Securities and Futures Act, they are
unlikely to be able to claim substantial damages due to the requirement that plaintiffs must be
contemporaneous traders and the ceiling on recovery; and
2. an independent financial adviser is directly liable to its listed company (clients) for fraudulently or
negligently prepared opinions if its client suffered losses arising from the reliance on such opinion
at common law. However, if the adviser is only negligent, its liability may be reduced if there is
contributory negligence on the part of the client.
The objective of the civil liability regime should be to achieve the right balance in encouraging
independent financial advisers to issue informative and meaningful opinions and allowing
114 See United Kingdom, Code Committee of Takeover Panel, Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids,
2010/22 (21 October 2010) at [6.10]-[6.12].
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shareholders to recover their losses in appropriate situations. To deal with the gap in (1), it is
suggested that the existing compensation framework in the Securities and Futures Act be amended to
allow for a statutory remedy where there is a fraudulent or reckless contravention of a market
misconduct statutory provision. The concepts of contemporaneous traders and ceilings on recovery in
the Securities and Futures Act should be removed. In other words, shareholders may claim against the
fraudulent or reckless independent financial adviser if they have reasonably relied on the adviser’s
opinion issued in the takeover which is disclosed to the securities market, without having to show that
the opinion was intended to be relied on by the shareholders. They will, of course, have to prove
causation and losses suffered. Losses will not include reflective losses, that is, the situation in (2), and
the recovery of such losses should properly be brought by the company.
By making independent financial advisers potentially liable on their opinions for substantial
damages, independent financial advisers will be incentivised to take due care in investigations and be
deterred from issuing biased opinions or opinions that they do not genuinely hold. However, it is not
suggested that negligence should be the basis of liability for the following reasons. First, there is a
high risk of unmeritorious and speculative claims by shareholders against independent financial
advisers, given the deep pocket syndrome and the fact that the damages, which will be measured by
the losses of the plaintiff shareholders, can be very high. In Australia, the claims by the former
shareholders of GIO Australia against GIO Australia, its advisers and directors for, inter alia,
misleading and deceptive conduct and negligence arising out of the takeover documentation, were
settled for A$97 million in 2003.115 In contrast, speculative litigation with fraud is less likely, given
that these claims can be struck out early in the absence of evidence.116 Secondly, a negligence
standard may not actually promote meaningful independent financial advisers’ opinions. In fact, the
opinions are likely to be even more qualified and less informative than they are currently. The
proposed code of conduct would provide an objective standard of “fair and reasonable” for assessing
the offer but would not be able to specify comprehensively the assumptions and qualifications that are
permissible. Thirdly, negligence as a basis of liability is unlikely to have any significant deterrent
effect; damages that are paid out to shareholders for the independent financial adviser’s negligence are
likely to be shifted back to the listed company under the indemnity which the independent financial
adviser often has from its client (the listed company) in the contract of retainer.117
By confining the claims to fraud or recklessness, it is unlikely that the proposed amendment
would lead to excessive liability on the part of advisers, particularly since contingent fees are not
permitted in Singapore. The negligence standard would continue to be enforced through regulatory
actions, such as sanctions by the Securities Industry Council and possible regulatory action by the
Monetary Authority of Singapore.
CONCLUSION
The Takeover Code and Listing Manual require companies which are the subject of takeover offers or
which are entering into related party transactions in certain situations to obtain independent advice
from independent financial advisers. This article argues that independent financial advisers’ opinions
have important informational roles in the securities market but there are problems and limitations with
the current use of such opinions. In takeovers, there is no objective test to evaluate the transactions,
and independent financial advisers have substantial discretion in determining the appropriate
methodology and assumptions. Independent financial advisers also face an inherent bias which cannot
be completely eliminated by independence requirements or concerns over its reputation. The current
115 GIO Australia would pay A$56.8 million, with the balance being paid by the nine former directors and the various advisers
(including the independent expert and financial advisers). Costs were also awarded for A$15 million. See King v AG Australia
Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings) [2003] FCA 980; and Hodge N, “GIO Shareholders Win Record Settlement”,
Business Insurance (23 September 2003).
116 Rules of Court (Sing), O 18, r 19.
117 This consideration is not applicable where the independent financial adviser is fraudulent or reckless as the adviser will not
generally be able to invoke the indemnity, which generally has a carve-out in respect of losses arising from the adviser’s fraud
or recklessness.
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civil liability regime for advisers’ opinions rendered in takeovers is highly unsatisfactory as
shareholders face significant limitations in bringing claims against advisers.
In order to address these problems, it is suggested that a code of conduct be put in place to
regulate not only the independence of independent financial advisers but also the content of their
opinions so as to improve the quality. However, it is not proposed to prescribe the appropriate
valuation methodologies to be used, which is a decision for the adviser. In exceptional situations, the
courts should review the assumptions and methodologies that are used, which will increase the
incentives for advisers to provide adequate justifications in the opinions rendered and disincentives to
render biased opinions. For independent financial advisers’ opinions issued in takeovers, shareholders
should be able to claim compensation for relying on misleading adviser opinions where advisers have
acted fraudulently or recklessly. This will further incentivise independent financial advisers to take
reasonable care and reduce incentives for rendering opinions that favour targets or their controlling
shareholders.
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